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( 1) 
INTRODUCTION 
The entrapment situation has not received much interest 
in New Zealand law until the last ten years. Thib s no 
doubt due to the apparent increase in the consensual type 
of crime since the 1960's especially crimes of immorality 
and involving narcotics and other prohibited substances. 
The Court of Appeal has been call ed upon to pronounce on the 
topic twice in the last two years 1 and on both occasions 
clearly stated that there was no doctrine of entrapment in 
this country. The doctrine was held to be foreign to English 
law 2 • 
A distinction must be drawn between entrapment and 
permissible police activity. An entrapper or an agent 
provocateur was defined in the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Police Powers and Procedure, HMSO 1929 as; 
"a person who entices another to 
commit an express breach of the law 
which he would not otherwise have 
committed and then proceeds or informs 
against him in respect of such offence 3." 
The essential distinction is drawn between persons who 
are predisposed to the commission of the offence and 
persons who would not have committed the offence but for 
the instigation of the agent provocateur or entrapper. 
The distinction was confirmed in O'Shannessy•s case 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
E v.O'Shannessy, Unrep.N.Z. et. of Appeal 8 October 1973 
E v Capner [ 1975 J 1 N.Z.L.R. 411 
R v, o• Shffnessy op. ci t., 2, notel. 
at Cmd. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTOR IA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTO~ 
(2) 
where the President said; 
"There can be little doubt that most 
jurisdictions descending from the Law 
of England recognise the broad distinction 
between the use of Police agents to 
present opportunity to commit offences 
to those disposed to such activity, 
on the one hand, and the encouragement 
or stimulation of offences which would 
not otherwise have been committed, on the 
other 4• 11 
It may not always be possible to draw a distinction 
between whether an accused was predisposed to the offence 
or not. In fact it is doubtful whether such a distinction 
is ever possible. The danger of the distinction is that 
any enquiry into the disposition of the offender may call 
for a consideration of his past activities to determine 
whether or not these shed any light on his disposition. 
To consider past offences before guilt has been established 
is contrary to English law and should be avoided. Lhe 
solution to the problem is apparent where there is a jury 
trial and an investigation into the police agent's conduct and, 
necessarily, the offender's disposition is conducted on a 
voir dire. The evidence on the voir dire would not go before 
the jury in establishing guilt so there would be no prejudice 
to the accused. Once an investigation is attempted into the 
disposition of the accused difficulties will always be 
4. R v 0 1 Shannessy op. cit., note 1, at page 1 
(3) 
encountered. The American defence of entrapment requires 
an investigation of disposition and the difficulties of the 
defence will be considered later. 
When a case involving police participation is reported 
in the newspapers the emphasis nearly always seems to be on 
the part of the police in the offence with the implied 
criticism that this is a breach of the "fair play" that the 
community can expect from the police. Particular emphasis is 
given to policemen involved, as part of their duties, in 
sexual and drug offences. It is the duty of the police 
to enforce the law so far as their resources allow. It is 
not for the police to decide which laws should be enforced 
and which should not. This is especially true when a law 
does not enjoy wide-spread support amongst the community. 
Many persons consider that the prohibitions against cannabis 
and certain abortions have no place in our criminal law. 
This may well be so but it is not the perogative of the police 
to make the decision. It is the police perogative to decide 
the methods that they use for the investi~ tion of crime. 
In cases of consensual crime the methods used will obviously 
be different from cases where there is a victim or a 
complainant. So long as the police remain on the correct 
side of the line no Court could interfere with the collection 
of the evidence. This paper is concerned with what happens 
when the police overstep the line. 
The entrapment situation calls for protection both 
(4) 
for the accused and the machinery of justice. Where there 
is no objectionable behaviour on the part of the police 
the accused cc.n hardly complain that he was "hard done by" 
simply because he sold his narcotic, or whatever, to a person 
who happened to be a policeman. Gc~ ta1n crimes call for 
extraordinary measures and it may be that the Courts are 
more reluctant to make a finding of entrapment in crimes 
of terrorism or violence than other types of offence 5• 
Clearly, where state security or danger to life is involved 
the policy of ensuring fairness to the accused will be 
subordinated to a higher policy of protection of the state 
and of the physical well-being of its subjects. This is 
not to say that a finding of entrapment will always fail in 
this type of crime but that it will be more difficult 
for the accused to convince the Court that he has been 
unfairly treated. The approach taken to the entrapped 
terrorists in Mealey•s case will later be questionned. Ae 
a general comment it appears to the writer that a true 
entrapment situation should excuse the accused, either by 
1nadll1ssibility of evidence or otherwise, no matter how 
horendous the purported crime was. 
Entrapment is the encouragement of crime which would 
not otherwise have been committed. It is in the interests 
of the state that persons who are prepared to commit 
horendous crimes be apprehended but these persons could never 
be "entrapped" as, by definition, their predisposition 
excludes them from entrapment. Police conduct which 
e.g. R v Mealey f 1974) 60 er. App. R. 59 The Court 
faile~ to tina o~jectionable police agent behaviour 
arising from the infiltration of the Irish Republican 
Army ( I .R.A.) • 
(5) 
actively encourages the commission of a crime which would 
not otherwise have been committed is to be deplored no 
matter what the type of crime. It would be a mistake to 
assume that since persons belong to the I.R.A. or other 
terrorist organisations they are necessarily predisposed to 
the commission of crime. This seemend to be the error the 
English Court fell into in Mealey's case. 
The entrapment situation is still developing in New 
Zealand law and, as such, is not without problems. This 
paper will focus on how the various approaches to entrapment 
differ and decide whether any change is desirable in the 
New Zealand approach. 
(6) 
ENTRAPMENT IN FRAUD CASES 
Commercial fraud cases rarely have an aspect ot entrapment / 
the activities of the entrapping officers being largely 
confined to the more orthodox criminal activities. The 
reas on tor this must surely be that sophisticated commercial 
swindles involve sophisticated methods ot detection which 
are often outside of the resources of police departments. 
Countries which have bodies policing the Stock Exchange 
and Securities Markets are more likely to be able to have 
an officer infiltrate a ring of suspected persons and entrap 
them. It would be expected that infiltration of such a 
group would be a difficult task as men of commercial affairs 
dealing in large sums may be expected to know each other and, 
naturally, be suspicous of an outsider. 
Entrapment often finds its way into a commercial area 
where there are illegal sales, usually of drugs. However, 
it is rare that there is fraud involved in the sale. There 
was, however, in Wellington in the late 1960's a notable 
case of persons selling swamp-weed as cannabis. Unfortunately 
for the enterprising sellers they attempted to sell to an 
under cover policeman and were subsequently arrested on 
fraud charges. The policeman was not, of course, investigating 
fraud as such but was concerned with the sale of drugs in 
a certain hotel. 
The obtaining of licences ei ther by fraud or by bribery 
also has brought entrapment into the commercial area. 
(7) 
In E v. Timar 6 the facts were - a person complained to the 
police that Timar could obtain a master heating licence by 
bribing public officials. The police laid a trap whereby 
money was given to Timar to arrange the bribe. Timar never 
had any connections with the public official and it appeared 
that his ability to obtain licences was a fabrication. 
He was accordingly charged with fraud but ultimately 
convicted of attempted fraud as there was no evidence of 
deceit but only an attempt to deceive. 
On the periphery of the fraud area is the counterfeiting 
case of United States~ Chiarella 7 in the United States 
Court of Appeal where the facts showed that two Treasury 
agents "set up" the sale of counterfeited money to themselves. 
In Shaw~ United States 8 a defence of entrapment failed 
when the evidence showed the government agents had purchased 
petrol from the defendants in breach of rationing regulations. 
From the evidence it seems clear that the agents merely 
provided opportunity. 
In Kott v. United States 9 a conspiracy to sell liquor 
at an illegal price was infiltrated by a person acting in 
concert with government agents. An illegal sale was made to 
the agent and, when chargEtl the defendants raised entrapment 
as a defence. The defence was rejected as the defendants 
were shown to be experienced in black market transactions 
of this nature. 
While the commercial fraud area opens many possibilities 
6. [ 1969] 2 O.R. 90 
7. 184 F. 2d 903 ( 1950) 
8. 151 F. 2d 967 (1945) 
9. 163 F .. 2d 984 ( 1947) 
(8) 
for entrapment it appears that few cases will reach the 
Courts because of the difficulty in obtaining e' idence. 
Those cases which do reach the Courts will almost certainly 
be the llore simple ones involving sales or "con men". 
(9) 
VARIOUS APPROACHES TO ENTRAPMENT 
There is no general agreement in common law jurisdiction 
as to the juristic basis of the Court s ' approaches to 
entrapment. In the u.s.A. entrapment has been elevated 
to the status of a doctrine which, if successfully invoked, 
r-esults in acquittal but there is differing opinion as to 
its basis. By wa:, of contrast to the approach followed by 
the New Zealand Courts the current state of entrapment in the 
United Kingdom and Canada will be examined. 
It would be a mistake in considering any of these 
jurisdictions to assume that entrapment has found a clearly 
defined place in the law. Although the u.s.A. has a doctri.ne 
of entrapment there are insufficient clear authorities in 
the other jurisdictions to be able to adequately describe 
the place of entrapment in the law. The New Zealand Court 
of Appeal seems determined to resist the development of a 
doctrine, as does the English Court of Appeal. But there is 
the faint glimmering in Canada of the emergence of a 
consistent judicial approach. 
Where an entrapment situation is raised by the evidence 
four possible situations apply; 
(a) there may be a warning to the jury that the 
entrapper is an accomplice and that it would be 
unsafe to convict on his uncorroborated evidence, 
(b) the Judge may, in his discretion, refuse to admit 
(10) 
evidence from the entrapper on the grounds that 
the evidence has been obtained unfairly, which 
will lead to an acquittal if no other evidence 
is available. 
(c) the Court may stay the prosecution on the grounds 
that it is oppressive and an abuse of the Court's 
duty to ensure fairness and justice towards those 
who come before it. 
(d) there may be a complete acquittal on the basis that 
a finding of entrapment constitutes a defence to 
the charge. 
( 11 ) 
The Corroboration Requirement 
New Zealand: 
A fundam.ental principle of law is that the Judge 
must warn any jury of the danger of coming to a decision 
on uncorroborated evidence. Where there is no jury the 
tribunal must warn itself. Subject to the warning the jury 
or the tribunal are entitled to act on uncorroborated 
evidence. lO Corroboration will be looked for in five 
11 instances. We are concerned solely with whether 
corroboration is required where there is an entrapment 
situation. There are three possibilities; 
(a) the entrapping agent is not an accomplice and 
therefore no warning need be given, 
(b; although the agent is an accomplice in law his 
evidence does not require a warning, 
(c) the agent is an accomplice and a warning is 
required. 
Generally speaking where a person is found to be an 
accomplice of another the evidence of that person may not 
be used to convict his co-offender without a warning. 
There have been many attempts to show that the entrapper 
commits no crime 12 but these usually confuse motive with 
mens rea or offer special defences to entrappers. If no 
crime is committed by the entrapper then he is not an 
accomplice and the warning need not be given. The 
warning need only be given in the situation where the entrapper 
forms part of the crime. 
10 .. 
11. 
12. 
Cross R .. c .. Evidence 3 ed. 169 
Where there are accomplices evidence, sworn evidence 
by children, sexual offences, claims against deceased~s 
estate and matriaonial offences. 
See Carroll v Moore ( 19071 9 WAR 34, Ada.ms v People 
285 P. 1102 {1930Jand Heyden J.D. The Problems of 
Entrapment [1973]C.L.J. 268, 274 
( 12) 
The early New Zealand cases turned more on whether 
a police agent's evidence should be corroborated as an 
accomplice than on a consideration of entrapment. 
In McGrath v. Vine 13 Edwards J. held that he was not 
called upon to decide whether a police agent's evidence 
requires corroboration as had previously been decided 
in Smith~ O'Donovan 14 and in other overseas jurisdictions. 
The Magistrate had found no offence of fortune-telling made 
out and the Judge was not disposed to upset the finding. 
He said; 
"The case is from any point of view 
a very trivial one ••• Moreover I 
think the constable in pressing this 
old woman to tell his fortune, after 
s he had declined to do so, went beyond 
the bounds of his duty. The practice 
of entrapping people into the commission 
of these minor offences by means of 
police spies has been condemned by 
more than one Judge ••• " 15 
The case of Smith v. O'Donovan related to the purchase 
of liquor by two probationary constables acting under the 
instructions of their superior. The issue before the Court 
was whether the 3Vidence of the constables should be 
corroborated as being accomplices. The Learned Judge 
followed the opinion of Mr Justice Maul in E v, Mullins 16 
13. ( 1909) 12 G.L.R. 480 
14. 28 H.Z.L.R. S.C. 94 ( 1908) 
15. McGrath v ~ op.cit., 481 note 13 
16. ( 1843) 3 Cox c.c. 526 
e 
( 13) 
that the evidence of a police agent does not require 
corroboration. The rational behind this is that an 
accomplice confesses himsel ·' 1. criminal while a police 
agent may be an essentially honest man taking a course 
he considers essential "for the protection of hie own 
interests and those of society" 17• 
Cooper J. was not, however, blind to the dangers 
inherent in the entrapment situation; 
"No doubt a Magistrate in considering 
the evidence of probationary police 
officers who are, as it were, earning 
their promotion by, to some extent, 
their success in detecting offences 
against the law, will scrutinise such 
evidence closely and weigh it carefully 
before acting upon it". 18 
The Judge - made rule that police agents require no 
corroboration was affirmed in the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in E v Phillips 19• The case was an appeal from a 
jury trial where the appellant had been convicted for illegally 
selling liquor. The chief prosecution witness was a police 
officer who purchased beer off the defendant. The Judge 
had directed the jury that the officer's evidence did not 
reuire corroboration and this was affirmed in the appeal. 
Turner J~ recognised that an accomplice's evidence 
must usually be treated with caution as he may try to put 
17. ( 1843)3Cox c.c. 526 
18. Smitli v O'Donovan op. cit., 96 note 14 
19. [ 1963] N.Z.L.R. 855 cc.A.) 
( 14) 
all or part of the blame on another in order to purchase 
leniency or illllllunity. But; 
"This danger is conspicuously absent 
in the case of police-spies, who are 
seldom, if ever, exposed to any danger 
of prosecution and who, in the unlikely 
event of being prosecuted, would 
certainly suffer no substantial 
20 penalty "• 
The Judge, however, did not completely shut the door 
and recognised there may be cases where a police agent's 
avidence should be corroborated. This was, with respect, 
a wise conclusion to his judgment. There would be a danger 
of limiting the discretion of the Supreme Court Judges if the 
statement was left out. The case is interesting on another 
point in that the Judge does not exclude the possibility 
of a police agent being prosecuted as participes criminis. 
20. ibid., 858 
( 15) 
Fairness and Entrapment as a Defence in New Zealand 
The Court of Appeal's recent decisions in O'Shannessy•s 
and Capner•s cases f i rmly resist any doctrine of entrapment 
in New Zealand and clearly hold that entrapment offers no 
defence to a criminal charge. The Court is content to leave 
the entrapment issue to the good sense of the trial Judge's 
exercise of discretion, to exclude evidence which would 
operate unfairly against the accused. The origin and basis 
of the Court's approach will be discussed later. 
The facts of the two cases will, however, be described 
in some detail to illustrate the difficulties of deciding 
when an entrapment situation arises and m~ give an indication 
of how the Courts will be expected to act in a given situation. 
Roger Allan 0 1Shannessy was charged with the supply of 
cannabis and was duly convicted after a trial by jury. 
He appealed to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the 
police agent had stepped beyond the "fine line" and an 
entrapment situation arose. Unfortunately the admissibility 
of the offic ~r•s evidence was not challenged at the trial and 
there was no Y.Q1r 41.x:.e to e~amine his conduct in detail. 
In any event th& Court was, 
"far from convinced that this is an 
instance where the police stepped 
beyond the bounds of what is 
permissible into the area of 
,macceptable encouragement 21 11 • 
and "it is certainly not a case where an 
21. R v 0'Shannessy o~.cit., 2, note 1. 
( 16) 
appellate Court could say that the 
trial Judge had exercised his 
discretion in a wrong manner 22n. 
On the latte~ oint the failure to object before the 
trial Judge was held to be a material point and the appeal 
failed. 
The facts of the case were that a police agent had 
been introduced into a communal group who accepted him, 
not knowing him to be a police officer. The officer 
immediately requested members of the community to supply 
him with drugs. This failed. The officer then made it 
known to the members of the commune that he was under 
pressure to obtain some "grass" for one, •Tom Pritchard' 
an illusory but apparently unsavoury character from 
Wellington. 
0 1 Shannessy•s wife heard of the new member's plight 
and informed 0 1 Shannessy who contacted a friend who 
was a supplier of cannabis. Liability in terms of Crimes 
Act 1961 s.66 (1) (d) was attracted. The transaction was 
directly between the police agent and the supplier, 
0 1 Shannessy being at work at the time of the transaction. 
No drugs were found in either 0 1 Shannessy or his wife's 
possession. 
The case well illustrates the difficulties that a 
police agent faces when engaged in undercover work. There 
was no evidence at the trial that O'Shannessy had been 
22 • ibid., 2 
( 17) 
involved in the drug scene previously or that he was 
predisposed to the commission of an offence. The facts 
of the case came close to a police-manufactured crime 
although the Court of Appeal felt the permissible limit 
was not overstepped. The police officer did not put any 
pressure directly on the appellant. All he did was express 
a desire for drugs and when this did not work provided 
some moderately compelling reason why he needed them. 
Although 0 1 Shannessy did not exhibit a predisposition the 
officer did not directly inveigle him to commit a crime. 
Rather the officer offered an opportunity to several members 
of the community and it was the unwitting 0 1 Shannessy who 
availed himself of the opportunity to assist his "guest". 
The situation is clearly different from that of E v . 
2 I 
Shipley 3where the Canadian policeman had brought direct 
pressure to bear on the person who ultimately committed the 
offence. 0 1 Shannessy was not under any compulsion but 
was more in the position of a volunteer and accordingly no 
entrapment arose. 
As previously mentioned the admissibility of the 
agent's evidence was not objected to at the trial before the 
jury and 0 1 Shannessy was convicted and sentenced to one 
years imprisonment. 
On appeal the Court of Appeal in an oral judgment 
delivered by McCarthyP. confirmed the recognition in New 
Zealand of the broad distinction between the use of police 
agents to present opportunity on the one hand and the 
23. [1970] 2 O. R. 411 
(1 8 ) 
stiaulation or encouragement of offences which would not 
otherwise have been committed on the other. The Court 
noted there was a doctrine of entrapment established in 
America but went on: 
"But in New Zealand we have always 
approached this application of public 
policy (for that is what it is, as 
Mr Maclaren points out) by leaving 
it to the discretion of the trial 
Judge to exclude the evidence to be 
given by the police officer if he 
thinks that the conduct of that officer 
falls on the wrong side of the line." 
24 
The Court thought; 
"it pref8rrable to deal with questions 
touching the acceptance or rejection 
of such evidence on the basis of 
discretion rather than to lay down 
rigid delineations of areas of 
admission or exclusion. 11 
25 
As there was no objection to the evidence at the trial 
and as, in any event, the conduct of the officer did not 
fall on the wrong side of the line the appeal failed. 
Leave was granted to appeal against sentence which was 
reduced to six months. 
However the Court did not shut the door on a doctrine 
24. g v.o•shannessy op.cit., note2, at page 2. 
25. loc. ci t. 
(19) 
of entrapment developing at some future time and mentioned 
someday it may have to consider the extent to which public 
policy requires a redefinition of the extent to which the 
police may permissibly go. An opportunity to reconsider 
was offered to the Court in Capner but the Court declined 
it in rather terse terms. 
26 
Tierney William Capner was staying in a private 
hotel in Auckland pending his purchasing a home for his 
family who were waiting in Blenheim. Capner was a Justice 
Department employee on transfer. He became acquainted 
with Bevege, a police constable six months out of training. 
Bevege did not reveal his occupation saying he was a pig 
shoot ?r from the South Island. A warm relationship developed 
and the two became g0od friends. 
Capner was a cannabis user and appar~ntly knew other 
persons involved in the Auckland "drug scene." Both 
became involved in this "scene" and attended parties where 
drugs wer~ taken. They also hosted their own parties. 
Both purchased drugs from other people either jointly 
or singularly. Eventually, on three occasions Capner sold 
Bevege some cannabis. There was no profit motive involved 
and the sale wae r learly a transaction between friends of 
similar disposition. Unfortunately, while one disposition 
was genuine, the other was simulated and Capner was later 
charged with the sale of narcotics to Bevege. 
At the trial a voir dire was held which extended over 
26. li V, Capner n975.!1N.Z.L.R. 411 (C.A.) 
(20) 
two days and in which the conduct of Bevege was examined in 
detail. Despite Capner•s protestations to the contrary 
McMullin J. a~cepted Bevege's evidence that he did not 
pressure Capner to supply him with the narcotic. Corroborative 
evidence was called for both sides, seven persons from 
the "drug scene" for Capner and two police officers for 
Bevege. The Learned Judge did not find the constabl&i 
conduct so objectionnable as to render his evidence 
inadmissible and accordingly the evidence went to the jury 
and Capner was convicted. 
While drug sales to friends are, like other sales, 
contrary to law the police agent's conduct is open to 
criticism in that it does not seem necessary to go to such 
lengths to secure a conviction. If Capner was predisposed 
towards the offence he would have surely been found out in 
time. The motive for the offence was not profit and, unless 
Capner had a pathological urge to sell drugs without profit, 
the motive must have arisen as a response to his relationship 
with Bevege. The trial Judge's finding that Bevege did not 
instigate the sales must be accepted, however, it was 
probable that, given the environment .and given the 
relationship between the two, a drug transaction was likely 
to occur. 
Submissions were made to the trial Judge that an 
entrapment situation had occurred and he was invited to 
find this as a defence to the charge. Counsel submitted 
(21) 
that public policy did not support a conviction where the 
foundation for the prosecution was the entrapment of the 
accused. The Judge held that there was no objectionable 
entrapment and that, in any event, this was not a defence 
in New Zealand law. The matter went on appeal supported 
by 49 pages of written submissions. 
The Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the word 
"entrapllient" mainly because of the indiscriminant use 
to which thw word is put. In this the Court was following 
27 
the, then recent, English decision E v.Mealey which 
was, the~, only reported in the Times. 
On appeal Counsel argued that the relationship between 
Capner and the constable would inevitably lead to a supply 
of the drug. This was rejected on the facts by the Court 
after a perusal of the evidence. Counsel's next submission 
in point was that as a New Zealand Judge does not have the 
discretion to exclude probative evidence, albeit unfairly 
obtainea. the Court should rule that evidence which had been 
obtained by entrapment should be excluded as a matter of 
law. He was clearly wrong in this, as a New Zealand Judge 
does have the discretion and he was persuaded by the Court 
to amend his submission to one maintaining that the 
discretionary rule was inadequate. The Court declined 
to acceed to his request to define the law and preferred 
to leave the matter as decided in 0'Shannessy 1 s case. 
The Court was further satisfied that no redefinition was 
27. op. cit., note 5 
(22) 
required at the time of the decision and the appeal was 
dismissed. 28 
The case signifies the end of any hope of a judicial 
recognition of a doctrine of entrapment in New Zealand for 
some time. It is a pity that Counsel presses the entrapment 
situation when clearly the trial Judge had found there was 
no entrapment. It was 00vious that the appeal was doomed 
to fail on this ground at least and it thereby gave rise 
to another unsuccessful appeal based on entrapment. It 
seems pointless to urge a Court to lay down the law on 
entrapment when the facts do not support a finding of 
entrapment. Attempts to do so will hinder, rather than 
assist, the development of the law in this field. 
An analysis of the New Zealand decisions leads to the 
following submissions of the law of entrapment in New 
Zealand; 
1. the entrapper•s evidence generally does not require 
corroboration, 
2. there is no defence of entrapment in New Zealand, 
3. an objection to the entrapper•s evidence is generally 
essential with a subsequent voir dire, 
4. the decision whether or not to exclude evidence 
is a matter of the trial Judge's discretion, 
5. the Courts will draw a line between presenting 
opportunity (unobjectionable) and encou:r," ging or 
stimulating offences which would not otherwise 
28. This was consistent with Sneddon v. Stevenson [1967] 
1 W.L.R. 1051 
(23) 
have been committed, 
6. entrapment is something more than merely providing 
an opportunity, a general appeal to like:!.,r suppliers 
is insufficient as is the cultivation of a 
relationship. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
(24) 
The Origin of the New Zealand Rule of Fairness 
The Courts have moved away from the statement of 
Crompton J. in R v.,Le• tham 29 relating to the admissibility 
of evidence that; 
"it matter not how you get it, if you 
steal it even, it would be admissible 
in evidence." 30 
WM.le the statement may be strictly true even today 
the Courts have/ over the last century imposed limitations 
on the general rule so it does not operate unfairly against 
the defendant. For example where the evidence was obtained 
in breach of the spirit of the Judge's rules the Judge has a 
discretion to refuse to admit the evidence - so held the Court 
of Appeal in E v Phillips. 31 The Chief Justice took a 
similar approach in Daily v Police 32 a case involving 
the admissibility of blood samples in the case of driving 
a vehicle under the influence of drink where the accused had 
not been warned as to the intended use for the blood. The 
accused gave evidence that he thought the taking of his 
blood was to facilitate some treatment. The analysis of the 
sample was held to be admissible but the Chief Justice 
warned that this was not to be construed as a warrant to the 
police; 33 
"where necessary in the interests of 
justice the Courts will always use their 
discretion to exclude evidence which 
29. ( 1861), 8 Cox c.c. 498 
30. 1 bid., 501 
31. [ 1963] N.Z.L.R. 855 
32. [ 1966] N.z.L.R. 1048 
33. ibid., l 052 
(25) 
would operate unfairly against an 
accused person." 
There is high judicial authority for the obiter of 
the Chief Justice. In Selvey v.Director of Public 
Prosecutions 34 the House of Lords held that it was too 
late to say that a Judge had no discretion to exclude 
evidence which would operate unfairly against the accused. 35 
The weight and value of the authority on which the House 
of Lords based their decision was questionned by Bernard 
Livesey in an article in the Cam.bridge Law Journal 
entitled "Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial 
Evidence." 36 The writer concluded that the decision 
of the House of Lords was based on obiter drawn from a 
number of cases. An examination of the authorities 
indicates that this is the case but this does not affect 
the weight of the House of Lords decision. 
As the House of Lords said in Selvey•s case it is too 
late now to suggest that a Judge does not have the discretion. 
The New Zealand Courts recognised in 1945 that they 
could exclude evidence where the prejudicial tendency 
outweighed the probative value 37 and had earlier held 
that a •odge should specially caution a jury where evidence 
was admissible but of low evidentary and high prejudicial 
value. 38 Later the Court of Appeal's finding in Phillips 
was affirmed in E v Convery 3~ 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
[196~1 2 W.L.R. 1494 
ibid., at 1524 per ~ord Guest 
D9681 C.L.J. 291 
E ~ Rogan [1916] N.Z.L.R. 265 
R v. Adams and Blatt ~945] N.Z.L.R. 
ir968J N.Z.t.R. 426 
725 
(26) 
In 1971 the general rule in Kuruma v The Queen 
40 
was affirmed i n 1ew Zealand subject to the discretion of 
the Court to exclude evidence on the ground• of unfairness. 
In McFarlane v Sharp 41 White J. said; 
"The principle to be applied as to the 
admissibility of evidence is whether 
it is relevant to the matters in issue, 
not how the evidence was obtained. 
••• There is amp e authority that 
such evidence will be admitted 
subject to the discretion of a Court 
hearing a charge to exclude, on grounds 
of unfairness. 42 " 
The Court of Appeal. in Capner were quite firm that 
a New Zealand Judge did have the discretion to exclude 
evidence on the grounds of unfairness. Thie wae consistent 
with obiter in 0 1 Shanneasy and it can be seen that the 
proposition rests on an authorative body of cases in New 
Zealand. While the pedigree of the rule may be suspect 
it is clear that it is here to stay and no good purpose 
would be served by arguing against the existence of the 
discretion. 
There may be some doubt in England as to the extent 
of a Judge's discretion but this point was specifically 
mentioned in Capner. The Learned President mentioned 
the, then recent, case of Mealey in support of his proposition 
that some English Judges have doubts as to whether they can 
exclude evidence which has been obtained in an entrapment 
40. 
41. 
42. 
[ 1945] 
[1972] 
ibid.' 
A.C. 197 
N.Z.L.R. 64 
69 
(27) 
situation. However he went on to say; 
" ••• in this country we have not 
hesitated to develop the use of this 
discretion, and we think that this 
is a desirable attitude. 11 43 
The New Zealand Courts have developed the discretion 
in a short time. ' The discretion is available to be used 
in an entrapment situation but there is no absolute 
requirement that it is used. It is a matter of discretion 
and not a matter of law. Nor will the exercise of the 
discretion towards the defendant's favour automatically 
follow from a finding of entrapment. A Judge will then 
decide whether or not the admission of the evidence would be 
unfair but if the New Zealand Courts continue to take the 
approach to entrapment suggested in 0 1 Shannessy it is difficult 
to think of an en trapment situation which wou~d not be unfair. 
With respect, the New ~ealand Courts have taken the 
correct approach to the problem. Clearly a Judge should 
be able to exclude unfair evidence in a criminal prosecution. 
He shoul d not be fettered i n the exercise of discretion as 
no two cases are the same. The balance of the interests of 
justice and fairness to the accused is best served by leaving 
the matter to the good sense of the trial Judge. 
43. R v. Capner [1 975]1N.Z.L.R. 411, 414 
(28) 
Entrapment as Abuse of Process 
Canada 
The Canadian approach is interesting as, like New 
Zealand, the Canadian Courts have relied on English authority 
as the basis of their approach to entrapment. However, 
possibly because of the close proximity to the United States 
the Canadian Courts have moved towards an abuse of process 
concept rather than taking the more conservative line of the 
New Zealand Courts. 
The Canadian approach rests on the English decision 
of Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions 44 and the 
famous words of Devlin L.J. in that case; 
"Are the Courts to rely on the executive 
to protect their process from abuse? 
Have they not themselves an inescapable 
duty to secure fair treatment for those 
who come or are brought before them. r, 44a 
The case did not surface in Canada until the decision 
in E. v.Osborn 45 in which the accused was indicted in November 
1965 on a charge of having in his possession certain 
articles that were intended to be adapted for the commission 
of forgery. The charge failed on a technical ground but in 
May 1967 the accused again faced an indictment arising from 
the same fact situation that he conspired with certain 
persons unknown to commit forgery. The case is notable 
for the recognition that; 
44. 
4 4a . 
45. 
[1964] 2 All E.R. 
ibid., 442 
096~ 1. O.R. 152 
4a,1 
(29) 
"The foundation of the principle is 
the duty of a Court to prevent the 
46 abuse of its process." 
The Court was not prepared to confine its duty to secure 
fair treatment solely to its civil jurisdiction and did 
not see why the duty; 
"cannot be invoked to abate oppression 
caused by a multiplicity of charges 
successively made on the same facts." 47 
The Court was of the opinion that an abuse of process 
doctrine could be successfully invoked in the case to the 
accused's advantage but warned that each future case would 
depend on its own facts. The discretion should be 
exercised only where it is cl ar that an injustice would 
otherwise result. In the instant case the Court was 
satisfied that there was an injustice arising from ~he 
long delay in the presenting of the indictment by the Crown 
and the Crown's intervening appeal. 
The previous Canadian case of E v.Locl.eux 48 was 
referred to in the New Zealand Supreme Court decision 
E v. Capner 49 where McMullin J. cited it as an example 
of an attempt to put forward a doctrine of entrapment 
in a Commonwealth jurisdiction. The Ca ~dian Court was 
able to step the issue in the Lemieux case and did not 
have to determine the entrapment issue. The police agent 
had solicited the defendant and actively encouraged him 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
ibid., 156 
loc. ci t., 
(1967)63 D.L.R. (2d) 75 
Unreported, Audtland sentenced August 16, 1974 T 120/74 
/ 
(30) 
in the commission of an offence of breaking and entering. 
The defendant at first had no intention of attempting 
the crime and it would seem that a classic entrapment 
situation had been created. However, the police co-offender 
had been given the key to the property "broken into" by the 
owner thereof and, accordingly the Court found an essential 
ingredient of the crime missing. The accused was acquitted. 
The Canadian Supreme Court took a similar stand in another 
case 50 where it was held that there was no actus reus 
in a charge of keeping a bawdy house as the prosecution 
had failed to establish a "frequent or habitual use." 
It was found by the Court that a police officer had asked 
a woman to arrange three friends for entertainment but 
again the Court avoided the entrapment issue. 
S v. Timar 51 was a case which involved the passing 
of a bribe by the police AEJl n t to Timar who then was to 
bribe a government official to produce a false licence. 
In fact Timar never had an intention to bribe the officer 
and was therefore charged with fraudulently obtaining the 
bribe monies from the agent. Counsel for Timar argued that 
the Court should dismiss the indictment to express its 
displeasure at the type of police conduct, a submission 
which was grounded on public policy and not directed 
towards an abuse of process. But the Court did not consider 
the police's action unjustified because; 
(a) they had good reason to suspect that the 
accused was engaged in some sort of illegal 
50. E v. Patterson (1968) 67 D.L.R. (2d) 83 
51. [ 1969} 2 O.R. 90 
(31) 
activity, 
(b) they entered into offence for the sole purpose of 
det.ecting the designs of the accused, and, 
(c) t i1 8 accused was a ready and willing party 
and was not lured into the offence but merely 
given the opportunity to commit the offence. 
The Court is in accord with the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in the recognition of the broad distinction between 
providing opportunity and instigation. While the matter is 
not specifically referred to in the judgment it is 
a recognition of the issues which woul d be before the 
Court in an entrapment case. The Osborn decision closely 
followed Timar and it is not unreasonable to assume that 
the Osborn Court was made more confident in its approach 
by the Timar decision. 
Entrapment as an abuse of process was squarely 
faced by the Ontario Judge, McAndrew Co. Ct.J. in R v. 
52 
Shipley. Shipley was a rather n aire young man who 
formed a friendship with a person he met at the local 
Y.M.C.A •• Shipley attempted to impress his new found 
friend by assuring him that he could supply him with 
anything the friend wanted in narcotics. He could not 
have picked a worse thing to say since the friend was 
a police officer. The officer eventually borrowed some 
money fro• Shipley and then refused to repay the loan 
52. [1970] 2 O.R. 411 
(32) 
until Shipley supplied him with some cannabis. Shipley 
effected the supply and was duly charged. The Judge found 
as a fact that without the inducement held out by the 
officer Shipley would not have committed the offence. 
The decision on the point by the Judge cannot be seriously 
objected to as he had the advantage of hearing the evidence. 
However, it is worthy of comment that the officer must 
have only just come down on the wrong side of the line 
for the purposes of entrapment. The initial discussions 
were instigated by the accused and the officer had to do 
little to get Shipley to s upply him with the drug. It 
seems that Shipley in his naivety was "breaking his 
neck" to supply the drug to his friend. The loan 
involved was only $10.00 so the pressure on Shipley to 
supply the drug was not excessive. 
The judgment of the Court commenced by citing with 
approval the United States decisions of Sherman v. United 
States 53 and Sorrell! v. United States 54 which provided 
a guideline for what the Court felt was objectionable 
behaviour on the part of the police. The Court then 
went on to consider the distinction which was raised in 
Ti.mar•s case and the abuse of process do trine from 
Osborn's case. The Court held that it had a duty to secure 
fair treatment of those who came before it. 1n all the 
circumstances of the case it would have been unfair to 
the accused and an abuse of the Court to allow the 
53. 356 u.s. 369 (1958) 
54. 2, r u.s. 435 (1932) 
(33) 
prosecution to continue. The Court therefore "stayed" 
the prosecution. 
Connelly turned on what is sometimes called "issue 
estoppal" 55 whereby once an issue has been raised and 
determined between the parties, as a general rule, they 
are estopped from raising it again. The form of estoppal 
has been recognised in civil proceedings in New Zealand 56 
but not, to date, in criminal proceedings. 
Connelly's case introduced the possibility of issue 
estoppal to criminal law. The Canadian Courts have taken 
up the obiter in that case and applied it to criminal 
proceedings. There is no New Zealand authority on issue 
estoppel or the obiter in criminal proceedings but both 
are open to Counsel to argue. It is only a small step 
fro approving of Connelly in civil proceedings to 
applying the obiter therein in criminal proceedings. But 
while the New Zealand Courts may well develop their 
approach in this way the law on entrapment situations at 
the moment seems to be firmly grounded on a discretion 
to exclude unfairly obtained evidence. 
55. See for example Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v. 
v/o Exportchleb, [196512 All E.R. 4. 
56. Craddocks Transport Ltd. v. Stuart [1970J N.Z.L.R. 499 
(34) 
Entrapment as a defence. 
The United States: 
Since 1915 the United States Courts have been 
acquitting people on the grounds that they were entrapped. 
The doctrine had been suggested much earlier 57 but it 
was not until Woo Wai v. United States 58 that a defendant 
was acquitted on this ground. The doctrine became 
established by two Supreme Court decisions, Sorrells v. 
United States 59 and Sherman v. United States 60 • While 
the doctrine offered some relief for entrapped persons 
there is, as yet, unresolved argument about the basis 
of the doctrine and how it should operate. 
Sorrells was visited (during the period of prohibition) 
by a fellow army veteran who asked him to get him some 
liquor. A friendly conversation developed and after two 
more requests Sorrells complied and sold the friend one 
half gallon of whiskey. The friend was a prohibition 
agent and Sorrells was duly charged with the possession 
and sale of liquor. There was no evidence of a prior 
disposition to the offence on his part, although it was 
rumoured in the area that he was a rum runner. The trial 
Judge refused to allow the issue of entrapment to go to 
the jury but after appeals the matter reached the Supreme 
Court. The Court granted certiorari on the issue that 
there was sufficient evidence for the defence to go to 
the jury. 
57. See, generally, Donelly R.C. Judicial Control of 
Informants, Spies, Stool Pi geons and Agents Provocateur 
60 Yale Law Journal 1091 
58. 233 Fed 412 (1916) 
59. 287 u.s. 435 (1932) 
60. 356 u.s. 369 (1958) 
(35) 
There was a conflict between the judgments of the 
Court. The majority held that the agent had lured an 
otherwise innocent to the offence by "persistent 
solicitation" which was accepted by the minority. The 
judgments differed on three points. Firstly the majority 
argued that an offence of this kind was not contemplated 
by the section. The argument proceeded that while the 
words of the statute were sufficiently broad to catch 
the offence Congress would only be taken to intend an 
unjust result if the words were unequivocal. As the words 
were not unequivocal Congress is taken to mean by the 
statute that it was not intended to catch entrapped persons. 
The doctrine was therefore one of statutory interpretation 
resulting in a substantative defence which must go to the 
jury. 
The minority took a view somewhat similar to the 
Canadian Courts and held that the doctrine was rooted in 
the Courts duty to ensure a fair trial. Accordingly 
it is a matter for the dudge to direct the jury on. It 
follows from this that entrapment is unrelated to any 
question of guilt or innocence and no investigation of the 
accused's past conduct is called for. The minorities 
enquiry begins and ends with establishing whether the means 
employed by the police were objectio able. 
On the other hand, the majority requires that the 
accused be completely innocent and not predisposed to the 
t yne of offending. In determining predisposition an 
(36) 
enquiry into the accused's past conduct is called for. 
The next case of Sherman failed to resolve the areas 
of difference as has the 1973 case, Russell v. United 
States 61 • Sherman however indicates that previous 
convictions are not fatal to the defence. The facts 
were that a government informer met Sherman at a doctor's 
clinic where they were both being treated for drug 
addiction. After s c, eral meetings the informer asked 
Sherman to get him some narcotics, an issue which Sherman 
tried to avoid. Finally to relieve the agent's apparent 
suffering Sherman agreed to get some narcotics and was 
duly charged with the sale. On the issue of whether 
there was a predisposition the Supreme Court found that 
there were several requests and that Sherman was not in 
the business of the sale of narcotics. He had a previous 
nine year old conviction for sale of narcotics and a 
five year old conviction for possession. The Court held 
that this did not prove that he had a readiness to sell 
at the time that he was approached. Accordingly the 
conviction in the lower Court was set aside. 
The decision is a sensible one but illustrates the 
difficulties that a jury may have in deciding whether or 
not there is a predisposition. An enquiry into past 
conduct should not be encouraged as the accused's guilt 
should be determined on the offence with which he is 
charged and not on his past offending. The onus is on the 
prosecutor to prove predisposition although it is up to 
61. 93 s.ct 1637 (1973 ) 
(37) 
the accused to show that on the balance of probabilities 
he was induced to commit the crime by a police officer. 
The defence does not appear to be available for crimes 
against the State or for very serious crimes as these 
should be resisted whatever the temptation. 
The minority view is preferred. Firstly this avoids 
tortured logic as to the origin of the doctrine grounding 
it on the exercise of judicial discretion and showing that 
the Courts have a dominion over police investigation. 
Secondly the minority avoids enquiry into past offending. 
An airing of past offences could be highly prejudicial 
to the accused if the entrapment defence fails after having 
been put to the jury and the jury then goes on to decide 
the substantive question of guilt or innocence. Thirdly 
entrapment going to the jury as a defence may inhibit 
the defendant from putting up other defences on the 
grounds that the defences are inconsistent. 
62 Heydon 
shows that denial of actus reus is generally inconsistent 
with entrapment and accordingly each defence may prejudi ce 
the other. He goes on to say that the Courts tend to allow 
defences which might be inconsistent so as to ensure that 
the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 63 
However, this does not overcome possible prejudice in the 
minds of the jurors. 
It can be seen that the minority approach is not far 
removed from that taken in New Zealand although there is 
a different juristic basis. 
62. Haydon J.D. op.cit., 280, note 12. 
63. loc. cit. 
(38) 
ENTRAPMENT IN ENGLISH LAW 
The most recent case involving possible entrapment to 
receive judicial consideration in England is E v. Mealey 64 • 
The facts were that, one, Lennon had managed to infiltrate 
an organisation known as Sinn Fein which was an arm of the 
Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) although, not of itself, an 
illegal organisation. He was present when plans were 
discussed for a bank robbery to fund the I.R.A. and 
displayed a degree of enthusiasm for the raid throughout 
the preliminary discussions. When it came to a final 
briefing he managed to absent himself and was also not 
present for the raid. Just before the raid Mealey and others 
were stopped by the police and found to have the impedimentia 
of armed robbery in their possession, including sawn-off 
shotguns. Lennon subsequently made a statement that he was 
acting under pressure from the police and had informed on 
his colleagues. The I.R. A. , on discovering Lennon's 
identity, indicated their disapproval of his actions by 
shooting him. 
The English Court of Appeal used the same test for 
entrapment as did the New Zealand Courts and held that it 
was not established to their satisfaction that Lennon 
was a police entrapper. 65 They proceeded for the rest 
of the judgment however, as if Lennon 's conduct had been on 
the wrong side of the line. The Court held that there 
64. L1974J 60 er. App. R. 59 
65. ibid. ,61 
(39) 
was no doct1ine of entrapment in English law and that that 
was the end of the matter. In the present case there was 
no reason as to why the Court should impotie a lighter 
sentence on Mealey than his co-offenders. The Court did 
recognise however, that entrapment was a fadtor to consider 
in imposing sentence. 
The case is important as the Court found that as the 
facts were concerned solely ~ ~h the activities of an 
agent provocateur cases cited which dealt with the 
exclusion of unfairly obtained evidence were irrelevant. 
This is quite the opposite approach to that taken in New 
Zealand and in the writer's opinion incorrect. The result 
of the Court's decision is a dangerously limiting precedent. 
The decision is that firstly there can be no unfairly 
obtained evidence in an entrapment situation, therefore 
this evidence can not be excluded on the exercise of the 
Judge's discretion, although corroboration of an accomplice's 
evidence may be required. Secondly the decision affirms 
that there is no general defence of entrapment in English 
law. As a result of the decision a Judge is obliged to 
admit evidence even though it may have been obtained in 
what is truly an entrapment. By the decision the Court 
has abdicated its supervisory role over the police and 
appears to be content to their defining their own rules 
of conduct. 
The Court should have followed the approach taken 
in R v. Foulder, Foulkes and Johns 66 • In that case 
66. [19731 Crim. L. R. 45 
(40) 
the accused were charged with the unlawful possession of 
LSD. Submissions were made to the jury that the evidence 
of the police officer should be rejected in the exercise 
of the Court's discretion as he had incited the defendants, 
or at least one of them, to commit the crime. The Court 
found that the officer did in fact actively encourage 
the sale of the drug to him. The defence relied on obiter 
in Brannan v. Peek 67 • In reply the prosecutor cited 
Sneddon v. Stevenson 68 • Counsel for the defendant 
submitted that if in Sneddon's case the police officer 
had made the initial approach the case would have been 
decided differently. As it was, the i ni tial approach 
was made by the defendant. 
The Court agreed with the defendant's Counsel and the 
evidence of the entrapping police officer was not admitted. 
As there was no other evidence the defendants were acquitted. 
The cas e is a model approach to entrapment in English 
law. There was no recognition of any doctrine of entrapment 
but the Judge simply exercised his discretion against 
the admission of unfairly obtained evidence. In doing 
' 
this it was made clear that the Court expected certain 
standards of the police officers and would if necessary 
enforce these standards. 
67. [19481 1 K.B. 68 
68. [1967] 1 WLR 1051 
( 41) 
ANCILLIARY MATTERS ARISING FROM THE ENTRAPMENT SITUATION 
It has already been shown that in New Zealand an 
entrapper•s evidence does not require corroboration as a 
matter of law although it is always open for a Judge to 
require corroboration. It has been suggested that where a 
witness has a self interest in the outcome of proceedings 
and he is the entrapper the jury should be warned of the 
fact. 69 If a Judge has reservations about allowing 
uncorroborated evidence to go to a jury he should either 
require corroboration or warn the jury. It is pointless 
to require a warning about entrapper's evidence as a matter 
of law. It should always be open to the Judge to warn 
the jury if he thinks fit but to require this would, in 
many cases, throw needless suspicion onto the evidence 
of completely honest witnesses. 
Other questions which are raised by the entrapment 
situation are whether the entrapper himself is criminally 
liable and whether the sentence should be reduced on the 
grounds of entrapment alone. 
70. 
71. 
The Entrapper•s Liability 
70 . 71 In Brannan v. Peek Goddard C.J. said, 
"The Court observes with concern and 
strong disapproval that the police 
authority at Derby apparently thought 
it right in this case to send a police 
Heydon J.D. The Problems of Entranment[197~C. L. J. 268 
relyin~ on obi ter in R v. Prater [1960J 2 Q .. B. 465 
I 194&J1 K.B. 68 -
ibid., 72 
(42) 
officer into a public house for the 
purpose of committing an offence in 
that house. It cannot be too strongly 
emphasised that unless an Act of 
Parliament provides that for the purpose 
of detecting offences police officers 
or others may be s ent into premises 
to commit offences therein - and l do 
not think any Act does so provide -
it is wholly wrong to allow a practice 
of that sort to take place." 
The facts of the case were that a police officer had 
laid a bet in a public house after exerting some pressure 
on the bookmaker. An information was laid under the Street 
Betting Act and dismissed as it had no application to a 
public house which was not a public place by the terms of 
that A.et. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal contemplated the 
possibility of a charge being laid against a police agent 
in S v Phillips 73 although Turner J. thought that this 
was unlikely. In Sneddon v. Stevenson 74the Queen's Bench 
also indirectly considered the criminal liability of the 
police officers and decided on the facts that the case 
came nowhere near one of the officers aiding and abetting. 
The facts of that case were that two police officers 
had a prostitute under observation. One slowly drove his 
car past her and then returned stopping by her. It was 
73. [1963J N.Z.L.R 855 
7 4 • [ 1 ') 6 7 J 1 W • L • R. 1 0 51 
(43) 
obvious that this was to draw the prostitute's attention to 
the officer who, need.less to say, was not in uniform. The 
lady came up to the car and a deal was negotiated with the 
lady making the initial offer. Under these circumstances 
Parker c.J. held that; 
"all the officer did was to place 
his car in such a position that the 
appellant could solicit if she had 
wanted to." 75 
These cases indicate that the Courts are alive to 
the possibility of offences being committed by police 
officers. While there appears to be no legal justification 
for allowing officers to commit offences in an entrapping 
situation there does appear to be a strong practical 
reasons if there is no other way of apprehending the offender. 
Legal justification has been attempted by saying that 
motive excuses 76 or that superior orders justify 
77 
or that the entrapper only simulates mens rea 
78 
or 
necessity. 79 The attempts either confuse motive with intent 
or allow police agents defences which are not available 
to the general public. 
It must be conceeded,however, that the possibility 
of a police officer being charged with an offence is 
extremely remote in this country. 80 Mandamus will not 
lie to compel a prosecution and while an entrapping officer 
may commit a technical offence it is unlikely that he would 
be prosecuted. 
75. ibid., 1056 
76. Carroll v. Moore {1907) 9 W.A.R. 34 
77. Valler•s case [184411 Cox c.c 
78. H v. Salmonson f1960l (4) S.A. 748, 752 
79. Adams v. People.l1930) 285 P. 1102 
80. But see for a Canadian case dhere a prosecution was 
brought against a police officer E v. Petheran 1936 
(44) 
Sentencing 
There was no appeal against sentence in Capner but in 
0'Shannessy the appellant received special leave to appeal 
against sentence during the course of the appeal against 
conviction. The Learned Judge said that he dio ,ot want 
to enter into the question of whether an entrapment 
situation should call for a reduction in sentence as in 
that case there was no entrapment made out. However he 
went on to say; 
"But the facts that the appellant 
was approached, invited to help by 
a police officer and himself made 
no advances go materially to the 
extent of his involvment. We think 
that is an important element when 
it comes to sentence." 81 
There is no reported case of the New Zealand Courts 
which directly faces the question of reduction of sentence 
on the entrapment situation. The English Courts usually 
approach police involvment as grounds for reducing sentence 
The leading authority is Browning v. J.W.H. Watson 
83 
(Rochester) Limited where the defendant was charged with 
unlawfully permitting a motor coach to be used as an express 
carriage without a licence. The coach had been hired to a 
private club but two transport inspectors had managed to get 
aboard without the charter party organisers noticing. 
81. R v. 0 1 Shannessy op. cit., 3 note 1. 
82 
82. eg. Mealey where the Court decided not to reduce sentence 
83, U953]2 Q.B.D. 775 
(45) 
To his credit the agistrate dismissed the information 
on the grounds of lack of knowledge on the part of the 
accused. On appeal to the Queen's Bench the appellate Court 
held (rightly in law) that the information could not be 
dismissed on this ground but said; 
" ••• we remind Magistrates that it 
is possible for them to grant an absolute 
discharge and it is not necessary for 
them when they do grant an absoluLe 
discharge to order payment of costs." 84 
A similar approach was taken in E v. Birtles 85 
where a police officer was involved in encouraging the 
defendant to commit a crime which may not have otherwise 
been committed. The sentence was reduced from five ye~rs 
to three years clearly because the Court felt that the 
police had gone too far. 
86 Heydon 8 ays that the purpose for reduction of 
sentence ie to; 
"register the Court's disapproval of 
the police conduct and perhaps to 
alleviate any sense of injustice felt 
by the accused." 87 
However a New Zealand Court shou~d be required to consider 
a reduction of sentence where despite the entrapment it 
admits the evidence and convicts the accused. If the entrappers 
evidence is excluded there would generally be no grounds 
84. ibid., 779 
85. (19691 2 All ER 1431 
86. Haydon J.D. op. cit., 285, note 12. 
87. lac. cit. 
(46) 
for a conviction. If the Court feels that the collection 
of evidence was performed in an unfair way it should not 
admit that evidence. If entrapment evidence is admitted 
it must be because in the circumstances of the case the 
Judge thought that it was fair to admit it. If the entrap-
ment was fair then there can be no grounds for reduction 
of sentence. 
The Courts should, however, consider reductions in 
non-entrap~ent cases such as O'Shannessy's where the 
accused has no prior disposition and the policeman exerts 
a gent~e pressure not sufficient to entrap. The real 
reason for this is not to salve the accused's feelings but, 
where appropriate, to register disapproval of police action. 
(47) 
CONCLUSION 
The New Zealand Courts take a correct approach in 
leaving the entrapment issue to be decided by a Judge. 
The Judge has the discretion whether or not to admit evidence 
and if the evidence was obtained by an entrapment process 
he would, presumably, not admit it. This approach avoids 
the problems which the American Courts face in applying 
the majority approach. There is no pcssible conflict of 
defences and no prejudice in the minds of the jurors when 
the decision rests with the Judge. In leaving the matter 
to judicial discretion the New Zealand Courts come close to 
the Canadian and American minority approaches. English 
Courts differ fro L, the others as it is doubtful whether 
there, a Judge has the discretion to exclude evidence which 
is obtained by an entrapment process. 
The Canadian and American minority both see the 
discretion to exclude entrapment evidence as being rooted in 
the Courts role of maintaining its own integrity with 
evidence obtained by entrapment being a lowering of 
standards in the Court and demeaning the Court. The Court 
must keep its own house pure. The New Zealand approach 
rests on public policy and extends only to the exclusion 
of unfairly obtained evidence. Accordingly it is not a 
substantive defence to the charge and if the Judge exercises 
his discretion against the entrapped that usually would be 
the end of the matter. Appellate Courts are notably loathe 
(48) 
to review the exercise of judicial discretion. If a 
situation arose in New Zealand where evidence pointing 
towards entrapment was discovered after the trial 88 the 
defendant would have to move for a new trial on the grounds 
of new evidence becoming available. 
The requirement of the New Zealand definition of 
entrapment that the defendant was encouraged to commit 
offences that he wouid not have otherwise committed may 
involve the Judge going into the defendant's past conduct 
to decide if he was predisposed to the offence. This is 
unfortunate as English law maintains that a man's record 
should not be taken into account in deciding his guilt. 
Further , if the entrapper's evidence is not objected to then 
it would go before the jury and any chance of it being 
later excluded would be lost, and probably pointless. This 
could be avoided by confining the enquiry to the police 
officer's conduct. That is, on the evidence did he encourage 
and instigate the commission of an offence - as opposed to 
taking advantage of an opportunity to entrap an offender. 
Prejudicing the jury is avoided in the New Zealand 
Courts by holding a voir dire to enquire into the police 
conduct. The jury are not present during this and the 
evi .ence goes to the jury only once the question of 
admissibility has been decided. The possible prejudice 
inherent in the American majori t y approach is thus avoide d. 
The New Zealand approach requires the accused to object 
88. As in Mealey•s case 
(49) 
before an enquiry into entrapment can be made. Because of 
a different doctrinal basis the Canadian approach does not 
requi -e the accused to do anything as the matter rests 
entirely with the Court keeping its own house in order. 
The Canadian and Ameri can minority approach is to be preferred 
because there is no enquiry into past conduct and failure 
to object to evidence is not fatal. Th~ Courts should 
maintain their own house without requiring an objection to 
evidence. Some caseB of entrapment have shown monstrous 
abuses by the police and the Courts should decline to hear 
evidence obtained by unfair means on its own n r t ion. There 
is no problem of onus in the preferred approach. All that 
has to be done is to show an inducement and the Court makes 
its own enquiry from then on. Further, the voir dire can 
be a cumbersome and time wasting process. Judici al enquiry 
would avoid this but to avoid prejudice the jury should 
not be present during this enquiry. 
There is no advantage in having a defence of entrapment 
able to go to the jury. The defence woul d raise more 
problems than it solves. It is proper to leave the matter to 
judicial discretion but, in New Zealand, the discretion has 
the wrong juristic basis. The approach is needlessly 
cumbersome and has problem areas which could be avoided by 
following the Canadian approach. New Zealand is fortunate 
in that there does not seem to be a case where the police 
have actually entrapped a suspect. If there was an 
(50) 
entrapment case proved before the Courts the issue would 
have to be squarely faced. In these circumstances it is 
to be hoped that the Courts would reconsider the basis of 
their approach but the present indications are that this is 
unlikely. 
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